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The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa 
III. The Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan 
By THEODORE W. ScnuLTZ and A.G. BLACK 
AG RI CULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND 
MECHANIC ARTS 
R. :M. Hucnu, Acting Director 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SECTION 
A!-.IES,IOWA 
Foreword 
The domestic allotment plan is being seriously cortsidered 
by Congress. 
The plan was originally proposed by the late W. J. Spill-
man. Since then it has undergone successive modifications at 
the hands of Professors J. D. Black and M. L. Wilson. A bill 
embodying the voluntary domestic allotment idea was intro-
duced during the last session of Congress by Senator Norbeck 
of South Dakota and Representative Hope of Kansas. 
The discussion that follows is, in the main, based on the 
Norbeck-Hope bill. What is said is of necessity tentative. 
The plan is comparatively new. There is no assurance that it 
will not be materially modified by those now working on it. 
Our purpose is to point out the essential features of the 
plan as now proposed, rather than to pass judgment. Our 
task is to show the proposal in its various phases and to con-
sider some of the problems that its application would involve. 
This discussion should prepare the way for a more thorough 
study of it by Corn Belt farmers and farm leaders. · 
This manuscript is the third in a series dealing with the 
agricultural depression. The first, "The Situation Today,'' 
deals with the facts of the present agricultural crisis. The 
second, "The Causes of the Emergency," analyzes the factors 
that have brought on the emergency. The present publication 
considers one of the plans suggested for agricultural relief. 
The next publication in the series will take up the Iowa farm 
mortgage situation. Subsequent booklets will deal with truces, 
monetary and banking problems and agricultural tariffs. 
These publications may be secured by writing to the Bulle-
tin Office, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. 
The Agricultural ~mergency in Iowa 
III. The Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan 
By THEODORE W. SCHULTZ and A. G. Bu.cit 
THE PLAN 
In simplest terms, the domestic allotment plan proposes to 
do two things: (1) Give the wheat, cotton, hog, tobacco, and 
rice farmers certain benefits equivalent to the tariff on that 
part of their production consumed within the United States, 
(2) provide the necessary control measures to keep the pro-
ducers from expanding production and, also, if necessary, 
bring about a gradual reduction. Seven essential features 
underlie the plan: 
1. The voluntary choice of farmers in entering-the plan. 
2. The collection of the required allotment funds from proces-
sors ·and manufacturers - millers, pac~ers, textile manufac-
turers, etc.-by means of an excise tax or "tariff adjustment 
charge" on that part of the commodity prepared for domestic 
consumption. 
3. A yearly estimate of the total quantity of crops (wheat, 
cotton, tobacco and rice) required for domestic use other _than 
feed and seed and the number of hogs needed for consumption 
other than for breeding stock and farm use. 
4. Allotment of this total among individual producers in 
proportion to the past production of their present farms. 
5. The distribution to allotment holders of a payment or "tariff 
benefit" on each unit of the domestic allotments. 
6. The signing of a contract by allotment holders agreeing 
·to restrict production if and as the administrative agency may 
decide. 
7. The automatic discontinuation of the plan when the pur-
chasing power of the commodity reaches the 1910-1914 level. 
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Voluntary Aspect of Plan 
The plan is voluntary because the claim to tariff payments 
would be acquired by vol~ntary signature t.o an.d fulfillm!=nt of 
a contract whereby farmers agree to limit or reduce their pro-
duction if and as directed by the administrative agency. In no 
case would it go into effect until 60 percent of th~ producers 
of a commodity so desired. All farmers who felt that they 
were sacrificing their personal liberty in entering the required 
production contract could stay out. They could continue to 
produce as much as they desired but of course would get none 
of the tariff payments. The expression of willingness of 60 
percent of the producers may be measured either by number 
or by average annual production. 
Collecting the Required Allotment Funds 
Wheat, cotton, hogs, tobacco and rice are the· principal 
farm exports. These are specifically included in the bill. Pro-
vision is made for an extension to other farm commodities 
when desirable. A "tariff adjustment charge" will be collected 
on domestic consumption. The amount to be collected is, 
except for cotton, the existing tariff; wheat, 42 cents a bushel ; 
cotton, 5 cents a pound; hogs, 2 cents a pound; tobacco, 5 cents 
a pound; rice, ~ cent a pound. This so-called tariff adjust-
ment charge, which is in reality an excise tax, will be collected 
from those who process, manufacture, or distribute the product 
for domestic consumption. At just what point the tax will be 
levied is not fixed. Whether it will be at the time of processing 
or sale depends upon which proves the more equitable. When 
a processor exports any part of the commodity on which he 
has paid a tax, he will be refunded the amount of the tax. 
The allotment faoul derived from the tax is to be paid to the 
producers. It is a payment distinctly separate from the price 
of the commodity. Each farmer is to receive his prorata share 
of this tariff payment, provided he signs a contract to restrict 
his production. 
Estimate of Domestic Consumption 
The amount of the payment to individual farmers is to be 
determined by the quantity of the commodity processed on 
which the tax is collected, the height of the tax, the adminis-
trative expenses deducted and the aggregate allotment of pro-
ducers who are entitled to receive the payments. 
First in importance is the size of the yearly tariff allotment 
fund. This will depend, as already stated, chiefly upon two 
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things, (1) the quantity of the commodity consumed within the 
United States, and (2) the height of the tax. We consume 
annually about 500,000,000 bushels of wheat in contrast to 
20,000,000 bushels of rice. ·Obviously; with the ·same tariff 
tax per bushel the tariff allotment fund for wheat will be 25 
times as large as that for rice. But there are, of course, many 
more wheat than rice growers. Table I shows the maximum 
amount that possibly can be collected for each of the five 
commodities, unless production is sharply reduced. It is based 
on the existing tariff rates, except cotton, which is calculated 
at S cents a pound. 
TABLE I. ESTIMATED ANNUAL MAXU.lUM TARIFF PAYMENTS TO 
l'RODUCERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
lllaximmn 
Units of Production• Consumption• ~adments• 
To producers of: measure (in thousand.) (in tbouaanib) (mil 1ondollan) 
Hop Pounds 14,950,000 13,390,000 267 
Wheat Busbela 860,000 500,000 210 
Cotto- Bales 14,800 6,600 165 
Tobacco ---Pounds 1,400,000 900,000 45 
Rice Bushels 43,000 20.000 6 
-Total 693 
• Five-:rear uerage, 1926-1930. 
•Assuming that tbe wbole burden of the tax Is bome b:r the consumer and that there 
is no decrease in the quantit:r consumed, and also, that there are no administra-
tiTe COits. 
Making the Allotments 
All allotments are based upon how much the state, county, and 
individual farm has been producing. In this the plan is really 
quite simple in design. The amount of the domestic consumption 
of each commodity is allotted to the various producing states in 
proportion to their average production in the preceding five years. 
For example, the annual domestic consumption of flour is equiva-
lent to approximately 500 million bushels of wheat. Since .Iowa 
has averaged only 1 pe~ent of the total production of the 
country, it is entitled to an allotment of 5 million bushels on 
which the tariff payment is to be made. 
The state allotment is to be divided among the counties in ex-
actly the same way. Each county will receive a share of the state 
allotment in proportion to its production. Likewise within the 
county, the total county allotment is to be distributed among the 
individual farms on the basis of their production of the past five 
years. Each farmer is then issued allotment certificates. These 
certificates will belong to the farm. They will be a property right 
over that share of the domestic consumption prorated to that farm. 
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The certificates presumably will have a fairly constant value. They 
are to be transferable. The plan intends that the certificates are 
to be discountable at the Federal Reserve Banks. Note again 
that the allotment certificates and the payments proposed on 
them are in no way connected with the going market price. The 
price structure is not affected. The payments are wholly supple-
mentary. 
Distribution of Payments to Allotment Holders 
Allotment holders are to receive a payment per bushel, bale, or 
pound on their allotment. The market price paid to the farmer 
would not be enhanced. Definitely, the tariff payments do not aim 
at higher market prices; it leaves them to be determined by the 
ordinary forces. The plan is income supplementing ancl not price 
raisi11g. 
The number and the size of the farms will determine how 
large a share of the net allotment fund is to go to each farmer. 
Incidentally, the name of the plan arises from the fact that the 
tariff payments are allotted to specific farms. A payment will be 
made to the farm regardless of the quantity produced or sold 
provided, of course, that the terms of the contract are not violated. 
TABLE II. ESTIMATED .AVERAGE ANNUAL MAXIMUM PAYMENTS 
PER FARM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Number of Maximum Average fa!Y1t1c:nt farms reporting payment nr arm (1930 Census) (dollars) ollara) 
Hop: United Sllltes 3,600,000- 267,000,000 74 
Iowa 180,000 54,000,000 300 
Wheat 1,210,000 210,000,000 174 
Cotton 1,986,000 165,000,000 83 
Tobacco 433,000 45,000,000 104 
Rice 9,000· 6,000,000 667 
•Number of farms reporting hop from 192S Agricultural Census. 
The Contract and Production Restriction 
A11otment certificates will be given only to those producers who 
will -sign a contract not to increase their production, so far as it 
is within their control. The producer, also, will have to agree to 
reduce his production should the administrative· agency . decide 
that a reduction is desirable. The decision whether or not a reduc.:. 
ti on is advisable will be made after considering both the economic 
prospects and the expressed opinions of the producers of the com-
modity. 
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This contract, voluntarily entered into by the farmer, is a most 
important feature of the plan; in fact, the heart of it. T~e c!'ntract 
feature is what distinguishes this plan from the equahzatton fee 
and export debenture. It is a real virtue of the plan that it would 
not stimulate production. Because no farmer is likely to pass up 
the tariff payments to which he is entitled by the allotment, it 
appears that he would gladly enter into the contract. But there 
is no obligation upon him to do so. If the contract is not observed 
he would lose his allotment rights. 
The importance of the contract around which the domestic 
allotment plan is built can hardly be over-emphasized. It gives 
a definite method whereby farmers can restrict production when 
desirable. It protects the plan against the charge of dumping; 
there should be no danger of reprisals and retaliations on the part 
of foreign countries. It prevents increased incomes from stimu-
lating production. Finally, it lays the foundation for a system 
of planning as well as controlling agricultural production. 
Purchasing Power Provision 
The application of the plan is contingent upon the condition 
that the commodity is selling for less than its pre-war purchasing 
power. After the plan is once in operation special provision is 
made for its automatic discontinuation when the price of the 
commodity rises to the 1910-1914 purchasing powc:r level. This 
feature of the plan is clearly intended to protect the consumer. 
The Application of the Plan Illustrated with Hogs 
From 1926 to 1930 the United States produced an average of 
14,950 million pounds of hogs annually. Iowa's production was 
approximately 2,935 million pounds, or 20 percent of the total. 
This, then, would be Iowa's production allotment. 
The pork and lard consumed each year in this countty is 
equivalent to about 13,390 million pounds of hogs livewCJght. 
The difference between 14,950 and 13,390 million pounds repre-
sents exports, principally lard. Iowa's share of the domestic con-
sumption would be around 2,678 million pounds. On this part of 
its yearly marketings Iowa is to receive tariff benefit payments. 
At 2 cents a pound this would net the hog farmers of Iowa a 
maximum of not more than $54,000,000. 
But how would the plan apply to a farmer who, for example, 
usually keeps 10 brood sows? For the past 5 years Iowa 
farmers have had about 2 million sows farrow annually. These 
sows have averaged virtually 6 pigs to the litter. Thus, if a farmer 
in Iowa had a production allotment of 10 sows, meaning 10 
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litters of pigs, he would be entitled to sell in the neighborhood 
of 15,000 pounds of hogs. On the basis of the calculations given 
above, he would receive tariff benefit payments on 13,500 pounds 
of his production. Therefore, if he sold for slaughter not more 
than 15,000 pounds he would be paid as a maximum on his allot-
ment certificate $270. 
In operation this would result in each farmer selling his hogs 
when they about reached the gross weight allowed him. With 
small litters it would mean heavy hogs and with large litters light 
ones. H is apparent that the certificates must be made transferable, 
in whole or in part. Thus, if a farmer lost his hogs by cholera, 
he could sell his certificates to another farmer. This would provide 
some insurance for his pig crop. Similarly, if his feed crop should 
fail, he could sell his pigs below the gross weight allotted to- him 
and also his remaining unused certificates. Under such an arrange-
ment there would be considerable freedom in handling the breed-
ing and feeding operations of the farm. 
Of particular urgency is the need for a thoughtful considera-
tion of the plan's application to the hog industry, mainly, because 
the domestic allotment plan has been conceived largely in terms 
of wheat and cotton. What can it do for the hog producer? Is 
it at all workable when applied to hogs? If it is, what specific 
modifications are necessary? These and related questions involv-
ing a more or less critical appraisal of the plan under Iowa condi-
tions merit, if not demand, the attention and study of Iowa farm 
people. 
THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATION 
Each farmer is to receive a prorata share of the tariff payments 
in proportion to his past production. How hard is it to make 
these allotments to individual producers? It is safe to say that the 
allotments to the state would be easily determined. Even the allot-
ments to the respective counties within a state such as Iowa can 
be made fairly satisfactorily on the basis of crop reporting figures 
now available. But the division of the total allotment of the 
county or township to each farm is likely to be a big task. To 
the extent that assessors' data are complete, this final step neces-
sary to make allotments is not a serious administrative weakness. 
It is assumed also that the claims of individual farmers within 
the township will be published and that this publication ·Will serve 
as a check on exorbitant claims. ~t would seem, therefore, that 
reasonably satisfactory allotments may be made to each farm. 
To change the distribution of the allotments from time to time 
so as not to impede completely the natural shifting of production 
areas also presents a problem. If it is done each-year, producers 
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may be led to increase their production unduly for a few years so 
as to get a right to a larger allotment. On the other hand, if the 
production quotas are not redistributed at all, it will greatly restrict 
needed adjustments in production areas. 
Another difficult task in administration is obtaining accurate 
information as to whether or not producers have fulfilled their 
contracts with regard to acreage devoted to wheat and cotton. In 
hogs, how is it feasible to determine just when a producer has 
increased his production? 
Then, too, the question arises, how is it possible to keep these 
commodities from being sold to consumers without the payment 
of the tariff tax? Processors may conceal evidence of purchase of 
hogs and production and sale of pork and lard to the retail trade 
and thus save the cost of the 2-cent tax. Conceivably, processors 
may enter into gentlemen's agreements to conceal a proportion 
of their transactions. In the main this problem is less real than 
it may appear. The inspection of slaughter and the various checks. 
on hog sales at the packing plants provide sufficient safeguards. 
A more perplexing administrative problem lies in controlling 
slaughter for local consumption. Hogs slaughtered for home use 
are of course exempt from the tariff tax. But slaughter for local 
sales by farmers and butchers is an important hog outlet, particu-
larly in the East. For example, SO percent of the farm slaughter 
of the New England states, compared with 2 percent for Iowa, is 
sold as pork. How is it possible to collect the 2-cent a pound tax on 
this local slaughter and not at the same time encourage the 
"bootlegging'' of pork? Is it safe to assume that public sentiment 
would support rigid enforcement of the tax law in farming dis-
tricts Further study may indicate some modification that will 
overcome this difficulty. 
SOME PROBABLE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE PLAN 
What effect will the plan have upon consumption, prices, shifts 
in production areas, trade movements, and the many other adjust-
ments that are apparently involved? All of these problems need 
to be carefully analyzed. Much technical information is needed. 
Special work is now being done by research workers at Iowa State 
College, at Washington and elsewhere. The result of these studies 
will be. made available as soon as possible. 
Meanwhile, it will be helpful to indicate some of the more im-
portant consequences that may be anticipated if and when the 
domestic allotment plan goes into effect. This discussion is at 
best only a preliminary survey of the economic effects of the plan. 
The following suggested consequences, provisional as they are, 
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should aid in focusing attention upon those parts of the plan that 
most need consideration. 
Plan Assures Minimum Farm Income 
The domestic allotment plan provides some important insurance 
f eatuies. The transferable allotment certificates assure the farmer 
of a minimum income regardless of low prices or crop failure. 
The tariff payments, depending mainly· upon the quantity con-
sumed, will not vary much from year to year. Because the tariff 
payments are certain they would reduce the hazard of price de-
cline. Thus, if the existing tariffs were added to the present farm 
prices of wheat, cotton and hogs, they would practically double the 
income that farmers receive from these commodities. In view of 
the ruinous low prices now current, the social importance of some 
such safeguard is patent. 
The plan is also an insurance against production failures. As 
already suggested, any farmer having lost his hogs due to cholera 
will still have his allotment certificates to sell. Similarly, it is a 
protection against crop failure. The need for some form of insur-
ance in cotton and wheat farming against crop failures has been 
repeatedly dramatized. The experiences in the spring wheat area 
in 1931 and the winter wheat area in 1932 are all too near 'to be 
forgotten. 
The farmer is to be given a payment whether he produces a 
single bushel, or pound of pork, provided he has been a wheat or 
hog farmer in the past. This is in some ways a wide departure 
from the usual social philosophy. It is justified, however, by some 
of our foremost economists on the ground that there is a net gain. 
They hold it is good policy to give up some production efficiency 
in order to obtain a larger measure of certain~ in social well-being. 
Would Prices at the Fann Drop? 
Will the packer, miller, and textile manufacturer simply pay 
proportionally less for hogs, wheat, and cotton when the domestic 
allotment plan goes into effect? Oearly, the assumption under-
lying the preceding discussion has been that farm prices will not 
be affected. 
Neither will farm prices drop by the full amount of the tariff 
tax nor will the consumer bear the whole burden. Talce wheat; 
the miller is to pay 42 cents a bushel tax. What will prevent him 
from paying that much less for wheat in the open market? The 
answer is to be found in world prices. If the miller offered less 
than the exporter could receive by shipping to Liverpool, his bins 
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would remain empty. And, presumably, if the total amount of flour 
consumed in the United States remained unchanged the farm price 
of wheat would not be lower after the adjustments were com-
pleted. 
But sight must not be lost of the fact that higher prices will 
decrease domestic consumption. The processor will try to pass the 
tax on to the retailer who will in tum raise his price to housewives. 
They will buy less. Just how much less is a rather technical ques-
tion. It would be different during depression than in boom times. 
Each commodity would have to be studied separately. 
Returning for a moment to wheat, to the extent that domestic 
consumption decreases, wheat prices will decline to a paint that 
will permit either larger exports or more domestic consumption. 
If, as is proposed in the plan, wheat acreage is reduced, the les-
sened consumption may be counteracted. Then, farm prices would 
not drop. 
The balancing of any decrease in consumption by less produc-
tion so as not to disturb farm prices and exports is the central 
idea underlying the domestic allotment plan. Whether or not this 
is a profitable adjustment for farmers depends largely upon the 
type of demand they are dealing with. In this, too, each com-
modity is different. In general, though, it is true that higher prices 
do not reduce the consumption of foodstuffs proportionally. The 
demands for necessities are usually quite inelastic in character • 
. W.ith .inelastic .demands the tariff tax will more largely be borne 
by the consumer. Here, again, the problem is very intricate. 
The demand for pork particularly presents a very knotty prob-
lem. The price interrelationship of pork, beef, mutton and eggs . 
is of special interest. Any appreciable rise in pork prices would 
cause housewives to use more of these other foods. The con-
sumption of pork would consequently decline accordingly but this 
very process of substitution would increase the demand for pork 
substitutes, hence their price. Thus, indirectly the plan will benefit 
the cattle, sheep and poultry farmers. The problem is not whether 
substitution will re.sUlt but to what extent it is likely to take place: 
Again, the question can only be raised at this time. 
Probable Immediate 'Effect on Consumer Prices 
The domestic allotment plan will perforce increase prices to the 
consumer. But consumer prices will not increase at once by the 
full amount of the tariff charge. Thus, if the miller were required 
today to pay a tax of 42 cents, it would practically double the 
cost of his wheat. But even though the cost of wheat to the miller 
were increased from around 40 cents to 80 cents a bushel, it is 
not likely that the price of flour, much less of bread, would rise 
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proportionally. For the time being much of the tariff tax would 
be absorbed in the distributive system in the same way that much 
of the price decline. of these raw materials has not been reflected 
in retail prices. 
Although in general consumer prices ~11 not increase at once 
by the full amount of the tax, some will do so more quickly than 
others. Prices of cigarettes, cigars, and snuff in all probability 
will be influenced very little by a tariff tax of 5 cents a pound on 
tobacco. On the other hand, 2 cents added to the price of hogs 
would soon be reflected in higher retail prices. But generally 
speaking, should the tariff taxes go into effect now with wheat, 
cotton, hogs, tobacco, and rice, prices all proportionally lower-
compared with 1920 to 1929-than the prices of the respective 
consumer goods made from these commodities, it is probable that 
a large part of these tariff charges would be absorbed by the 
processor, manufacturer and distributor. 
Lard and Lard Substitutes 
Lard is being severely pressed in the domestic market by sub-
stitutes, particularly by vegetable oils. Presumably, the disad-
vantage of its competitive position would be further accentuated 
by the proposed tax on hogs. Several possibilities arise: ( 1) The 
packer may force more lard into export channels, (2) the tax on 
hogs may be shifted to other pork products, especially cured pork, 
( 3) some countervailing tax might be imposed on lard substitutes. 
The tariff tax applied to cotton may increase the price of cotton-
seed oil, especially if acreag~ is restricted. This, then, would help 
the lard market. The appraisal of each of these adjustments is 
not possible. The information at hand is too fragmentary. The 
outlook for lard and lard prices is even now clouded by a number 
of uncertainties. 
SUMMARY 
The allotment plan differs from the McNary-Haugen bills and 
the export debenture in that it definitely recognizes the need for 
some form of production control when prices are increased. The 
lack of ·such control is one of the strongest economic arguments 
that has been directed against the other two farm relief proposals. 
Oearly, the domestic allotment idea is a recognition of the prin-
ciple that a tariff does not benefit farmers who produce a com-
modity of which there is an exportable surplus. Since this coun-
try is committed to high tariffs and since foreign countrie5 have 
turned to almost every conceivable form of restriction-export 
bounties, licensing systems, import quotas, mixing regulations, im-
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porting monopolies, etc.-the domestic allotment plan has been 
developed to give the American farmer the benefits of protection 
for that portion of his produce used domestically. 
Although economic isolation is not in the best interest of the 
welfare of the world as a whole, we must recognize that the trend 
has been decidedly in that direction. The American farmer has 
been a victim of economic nationalism at home and abroad. The 
allotment plan is frankly a means for equalizing the social costs of 
adjusting the agricultural plant of the United States to this 
situation. 
With farm distress having reached the emergency stage, there 
is today a widespread feeling that the plight of agnculture reacts 
adversely upon the whole economic community. The purchasing 
power of farmers has been disastrously diminished. It is argued 
that it must be restored before it is possible to have business re-
covery. Many who heretofore have opposed the very idea of farm 
relief are now granting its necessity on social grounds. Because 
of this, there is the danger that the domestic allotment plan, com-
ing to the fore during a general emergency, may be adopted with-
out due consideration of the more important consequences that 
may result. 
In short, the plan calls for distributing tariff payments among 
producers on the basis of their past production. It derives the 
necessary funds from excise taxes levied on process0rs and manu-
facturers. The plan is decentralized in the procedure of making 
the allotments to individual farmers.· Farmers' claims to the tariff 
payments rest upon voluntary signature. The contract calls for 
a restriction of production as the federal agency may prescribe. 
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.RECENT ECONOMICS PUBLICATIONS 
The following bulletins and circulars were issued by· the 
Agricultural Economics Section of the Iowa Agricultural 
Experiment Station during 1932. They may be obtained free 
upon request to the Bulletin Office, Agricultural Annex, Iowa 
State College, Ames, Iowa. 
B289 Costs and Utilization of Com in Seven Iowa Counties, by 
H. L. Thomas and John A. Hopkins, Jr. 
B289a Why Com Costs Vary (Abridgement of B289), by H. L. 
Thomas and John A. Hopkins, Jr. · 
B294 An Economic Study of Hog Enterprise, by John A. Hopkins, 
Jr. 
B295 A Plan for Adjusting Cash Rent to Owiges in the Prices of 
Fann Products, by Millard Peck. 
Rl56 An Economic Analysis of Farm Mortgages in Story. County, 
Iowa, 1854-1931, by W. G. Murray. 
C13S Report of a Survey of Graded Egg Buying in Iowa, by W. D. 
Termohlcn. 
Cl36 Statistics of Livestock' Marketing and Livestock Trucking in 
Iowa in 1931, by D. A. FitzGerald. 
C139 The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa I. The Situation Today, 
by A. G. Black. 
C140 The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa Il. The Causes of the · 
Emergency, by Geoffrey Shepherd. 
C141 The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa III. The Voluntary Do-
mestic Allotment Plan, by Theodore W. Schultz and A. G. 
Black. 
Eorrott's NOTE: Bulletin No. 295 discusses the sliding scale rent plan 
as a scheme for basing cash rentals on the prices which tenants receive 
for their products; circulars 139, 140 and 141 deal with the major 
problems of the agricultural depression. These circulars and Bulletin 
No. 295 are concerned more fully than the other publications listed 
here with problems of immediate concern to the Iowa farmer. 
